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ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACT BY THIRD PARTY.
In the case of the Dunlop Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co.,' Lord
Haldane formulates in three fundamental principles what he
considers to be the present English rule of contracts, as regards
the rights of third parties. They are: I, That a stranger (i. e.,
one who is not a party) to the contract cannot enforce it; II,
That a person, with whom a contract not under seal has been
made, may not enforce it unless he has given consideration;
III, That a principal not named in the contract may not sue
upon it, unless (a), the promissee really contracted as his agent,
and (b), the principal *either personally or through the agent has
given consideration. These principles have been negatively stated,
inasmuch as it is with the position of the third party we are con-
Cerned. It is here sought to be shown that there is a vital dis-
tinction between principles I and II-which for brevity's sake
1(915) A. C. 847.
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will be designated by the Roman numerals-which has been very
little recognized by either English or American courts; and that,
furthermore, principle II is by no means so firmly embedded in
English law as the statement by Lord Haldane would lead one
to suppose.
The typical issue, in which one or both principles may be pre-
sented, is that in which enforcement is sought by a beneficiary,
either donee or obligee. But this beneficiary may hold one of
two positions. In I he may be a total stranger to the agreement,
to whom neither promise is made, nor from whom consideration
moves, or he may, under II, be a party to the extent that the
promise is made directly to him, though consideration move from
another. Pollock on Contracts, in the note on American law,2
points out the above line of cleavage. "Promises for the benefit
of a third party," he says, "must also be distinguished from
promises to one who has not given consideration for the promise";
and in illustration, though not affirmation, of principle II, goes
on to state that "there seems to be no good reason why A should
not be able, for consideration received from B, to make an
effective promise to C. Unquestionably he may in the form of
a promissory note, and the same result is generally reached in
this country in the case of an ordinary simple contract." Unfor-
tunately, however, this eminent authority proceeds to cite several
cases as being of this nature, among them the leading decision
of Lawrence v. Fox.3 This, it is submitted, is clearly incorrect,
inasmuch as the promise was made in that instance, to the party
who gave consideration, for the benefit of a third. Only two of
the six judges were of the opinion that by any manner of means
could the giver of consideration be construed to be an agent for
the third party, in receiving the promise. Other cases cited as
examples-but, once more, not in affirmance-of II are as
clearly correct,4 while an insurance case like that of the Palmer
Bank v. Ins. Co.,, in which there was a promise to the insured
to pay any subsequent mortgagee, is much nearer the border line,
though probably within the limits of I.
Anson on Contracts lays down that "it is now established that
no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of the
'Pollock: Contracts (Ed. Williston), 241.
'Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268.
"Rector v. Teed, 12o N. Y. 583; Van Einan v. Stanchfield, io Minn.
255.
'Palmer Bank v. Ins. Co., 166 Mass. i89.
'Anson: Contracts (Ed. Huffcut), io6.
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contract, though made for his benefit," while the editor in a foot-
note on American law declares that "if the promise is made
directly to the plaintiff, he may recover upon it, notwithstanding
consideration moves from another." As a matter of fact, Amer-
ican courts, as we have seen, have allowed enforcement by the
third party in both positions, thus denying the application of
either principles I or II to the law of this country. 7 Massachu-
setts continues to be the most reluctant to go the length of
granting relief to the entire stranger.8
It is now equally well recognized that, as regards the stranger,
English courts are of the same opinion as Massachusetts. Since
the case of Tweddle v. Atkinson,9 principle I has, as the Lord
Chancellor claims, become firmly established. There is much
more doubt as regards II. The comparatively recent decisions
of McGruether v. Pitcher10 and Taddy & Co. v. Sterious &
Netten. display a tendency to support it, but the respective con-
clusions are reached on the ground that conditions as regard
minimum retail price cannot pass with the goods and be imposed
upon subsequent purchasers, rather than upon the ground of
non-enforceability of a contract, once made, by the plaintiff who
have given no consideration. But in Slater v. Jones and Capes
v. Ball the defendant debtor was allowed to set up a composi-
tion agreement among his creditors, under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1869, in bar of suit, although no consideration had moved
from him. The later case of West Yorkshire Darracq Co. v.
Coleridge13 is decided independently of the Bankruptcy Act.
This was an instance of an agreement with the plaintiff, by the
plaintiff's directors, in return for consideration given by the
directors to each other, not to sue for their respective fees.
The plaintiff, in defending against a counterclaim by the defen-
dant for his fee, was allowed to enforce the agreement. The
opinion of Harridge, J., locating this case under II but specific-
ally disavowing that principle by finding for the plaintiff, takes
'Also recent cases: Uhrich v. Globe Surety Co. of Kan. City, i66 S. W.
(Mo. App.) 845; Grimes v. Barndollar, 148 Pac. (Colo.) 256; Stanley v.
Weston, 92 Kan. 317; Harbeck v. Harbeck, 149 N. Y. Supp. 79i; Torp 'v.
Jahn, 177 Ill. App. 85.
8 Sampson Co. v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 326.
STweddle v. Atkinson, i B. & S. 393.
"'McGruether v. Pitcher, 9i L. T. 678.
Tadd & Co. v. Sterious & Netten, 89 L. T. 628.
L. R. 8 Ex. 186.
West Yorkshire Darracq Co. v. Coleridge, 2 K. B. 326.
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a radical step toward the American doctrine. He says, "It is
contended for the defendant that though the agreement may be
binding as between the defendant and his co-directors, the com-
pany are not thereby relieved from liability to pay the defendant
his fees. In support of that contention the case of Tweddle v.
Atkinson was cited, reliance being placed especially on the judg-
ment of Wightman, J.; but it is clear that the plaintiff in that
case was in no sense a party to the agreement, and the decision
cannot, therefore, be regarded as governing the present case."
C. B.
PRICE RESTRICTIONS ON RESALE OF CHATTELS.
In a recent Federal case,1 the court held that an agreement
for price restriction in case of a patented article was binding
upon the vendee. Stress was laid upon the fact that the object
to which the agreement related was a patented article, thus
raising an inquiry in the mind of the reader as to what result
would follow if an ordinary chattel were involved.
That a general restraint on the alienation of chattels is void
is a well-established common-law doctrine.2  But this does not
mean that all conditions on vendee's privilege of resale are
invalid. For limited restrictions as an incident to the sale of
chattels are permissible at common law.3 The usual test of
validity is that such restriction must not be wider than the pro-
tection of the parties thereto demands nor so wide as to affect
the public injuriously-in other words, it must not be in unrea-
sonable restraint of trade.4 . And so even in cases of ordinary
chattels, the circumstances may be such as to make stipulations
as to price of resale binding upon the vendee.;
According to the decision of the'principal case, the patent has
added to the power of its owner enabling him to exact an agree-
ment from the vendee as to the price of resale even though the
effect is to prevent competition and thus maintain prices. So
that patented articles are exempted from the operation of the
usual common law inhibition of restraint of trade or monopoly.
1 Anterican Graphaphone Co. v. Boston Store of Chicago, 225 Fed. 785.
'Coke on Littleton, Sect. 36o.
'Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611; Walsh v. Dwight, 40 N. Y. A. D. 513;
Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72.
'John D. Parks & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24.
'See note 3, supra.
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That a patentee is so favored may be attributed to the patent law.
The protection given to inventors and authors in this country
originated in the Constitution." Pursuant to this provision the
Act of Congress provides that every patent shall contain "a
grant to the patentee, his heirs and assigns, for the term of
seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use and vend the
invention or discovery.
7
It is by virtue only of this act that the patentee can claim rights,
powers, privileges or immunities that are not incident to the
ownership of ordinary chattels. That the statute gives him the
power to prevent others from. making, using or vending his inven-
tion is clear. This naturally enables the patentee to control the
whole output of the particular article and thus gives him a
monopoly. So that a monopoly which is obnoxious to the com-
mon law is thus legalized. However, the added privilege of
making agreements restricting price of resale does not necessarily
flow from the express powers given by the act of Congress.
Once the patented object has been sold, courts might have held
that the exclusive right to vend had been exercised and the
patentee subject to the same law as the owner of an ordinary
chattel. As the general welfare of the people was to be fur-
thered by the encouragement of inventions the patent act was
liberally construed. The courts reason that inasmuch as the
patentee could create agencies to sell for him directly to the con-
sumer at certain prices, he should be permitted to reach the
same result by a different method, namely, by getting a binding
obligation from the vendee not to sell below a certain price. Or
it is agreed that excluding all others from selling includes the
lesser privilege of imposing such conditions as to the price of
resale as the patentee sees fit and the objection of restraint of
trade is unavailing.
If then we conclude that the patent law has clothed the patentee
with a power to control the price of his article by the method
of restrictive agreement, can he also attain this by means of a
license-restriction-notice so as to bind not only his immediate
vendee but all those that have knowledge of the price stipulation?
This depends upon whether we are ready to apply to patented
' Section 8 of article i of the Constitution authorizes Congress "to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."
' Section 4884 of the Revised Statutes.
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articles the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay8 relating to land, that
the condition or restriction attaches to the chattel and all who
take with notice are bound thereby.
In the case of ordinary chattels, the condition of resale, even
if valid, only creates a personal obligation against the party con-
tracting and purchasers with notice are not bound.9 And accord-
ing to the case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks &
Sons Co.10 the owner of a trade-secret article has no greater
power in imposing a restriction upon resale than the owner of
any chattel property. As regards copyright works, the Supreme
Court of the United States"1 decided that the main purpose of
the copyright law was to give the exclusive right to multiply
copies of works and for that reason held that a notice as to the
price of resale was ineffectual as against one not bound by
contract.
In the case of patented articles the English courts hold that
one who has taken with notice of a price-restriction of resale is
bound . 2  This view obtained in our Federal courts'3 until
reversed by Bauer v. O'Donnell, 4 which held that a patentee can-
not by notice limit the price of his article. As our patent law
is worded almost identically as the English one, our arriving at
a different conclusion must be due to a difference in the construc-
tion of the language. However, the Supreme Court has not
been consistent in its interpretation of the patent law. For
curiously enough, but a few years before the Bauer case, it
decided in Henry v. Dick Co.'9 that a license restriction author-
izing the use of a patented article only in connection with certain
unpatented articles made by the vendor bound all with notice
and the defendant who sold one of these unpatented articles
mentioned in the license restriction after notice was liable as a
contributory infringer.
An attempt was made in the Bauer case to distinguish between
these cases because one involves a restriction on use and the other
:78 1L R. 28g.
Taddy v. Sterious, [19o4] i Ch. 354; Garst v. Hall & Lyon, i79 Mass.
588.
1o 220 U. S. 373.
'Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339.
"Phonograph Co. v. Menk, i911 A. C. 336.
"New Jersey Patent Co. v. Schafer, 144 Fed. 437; Victor Talking
Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424.
14229 U. S. 1 (4 judges dissenting).
1224 U. S. I.
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on selling. But inasmuch as all the added powers and privileges
the patentee obtains are derived from the act that gives him
"the exclusive right to make, use, and vend," a power to impose
similar conditions and limitations must of necessity exist where
the exclusive right to vend is exercised as where the patentee
exercises the exclusive right to use. Perhaps the court has
receded from its former position in the Dick case and now refuses
to supplement to the personal obligation that may be imposed upon
a vendee by contract an equitable constructive obligation on all
those that take with notice of the restrictions or conditions. As
has been intimated before, the patent act does not expressly endow
a patentee with the extraordinary power of being able to impose
a servitude on his goods analogous to burdens on land. Nor
does this power seem to be reasonably incidental to the express
powers and the court is justified in refusing to give patented
articles the status of land and thus bind strangers by mere notice.
The principal case dealing as it does merely with the personal
right against the party who contracted appears to be sound.
For endowing patented articles with immunity from the objection
of monopoly is in line with the general policy of the law in
encouraging inventions. And as the law has granted the patentee
a monopolistic right of vending, it may be considered as fairly
incidental to hold that an agreement restricting the price of
resale is valid.
M. H.L.
ORAL ASSENT BY THE BANK OF.PRESENTMENT TO THE DIRECTION
OF ITS DEPOSITOR TO PAY HIS NOTE HELD BY IT FOR
COLLECTION AS DISCHARGING THE
INSTRUMENT.
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the recent
case of Baldwin's Bank of Penn Yan v. Smith is novel, striking
and of great importance in the practical workings of the business
community. The holder of a note payable at the W. bank sent
it before maturity to that bank "for collection and remittance."
On the due day the maker telephoned to the bank and, on being
informed by the president that the note was there, directed that
it be paid, and was told that that would be done. Seven days later
the bank failed without having remitted to the holder, or made
a transfer of credits, or marked the note or done anything further
to evidence payment. At all times the maker had sufficient funds
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in the bank to take up the note. In an action on the note by the
holder against the maker, it was held, that (i) the W. bank was
the agent of the holder and not of the maker; (2) the holder
must bear the loss caused by the negligence of its agent; and (3)
the note was paid."
The note being payable at a bank is equivalent to an order on
the bank, and the relation of the parties is therefore similar to
that of the parties to a check.2 It is pointed out by, the court
that the commonly accepted doctrine which makes the bank the
agent of the drawer of a check "to hold or to pay his money as
he directs" can not bear analysis.3 That the bank does not pay
the drawer's money, that it merely liabilitates itself on its implied
contract with the drawer, by refusing to pay its own money at the
direction of the drawer, whether the latter has deposited sufficient
funds before or after presentment, is asserted on unimpeachable
authority by the whole court in this case.
That the collecting bank is in fact the agent of the holder can
not be reasonably contested. If the holder had sent the note to
his own private general or special agent for collection, would the
maker be justified in refusing to pay such agent? True, his
having sufficient funds in the bank on the due day is equivalent
to a tender,4 but the maker being the party primarily liable, is
not thereby discharged. If such private agent had presented
the note at the bank of presentment on the due day, the maker
would clearly be liable to costs if payment were refused. Then,
if the holder chooses as his agent the bank which is the depository
of the maker, is it reasonable to suppose that his appointment is
a nullity?
The question arises, however, when did the bank become the
agent? The majority opinion declares that the agency was con-
stituted by the sending of the note; but, except as an act estab-
lishing one element of estoppel, the sending of the note could
surely not amount to more than an offer for an agency. The
minority opinion declares that the agency was constituted by the
'Baldwhn's Bank of Penn Yan v. Smith, 215 N. Y. 76; iog N. E. 138.
(Collin and Cuddeback, JJ., dissented; and Seabury, J., concurred in
result.)
2 Neg. Instr. Law, § 87 (Consol. Laws, § 147); iEtna Nat. Bank v.
Fourth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 82.
'See Morse on Banks and Banking, vol. i, pp. 700, 442.
'Neg. Instr. Law, § 70 (Consol. Laws, § i3o).
'Wolcott v. Van Sanivoord, 17 Johns. 248.
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receipt and detention of the note; and this, although involving
an acceptance of an offer by silence, commends itself as more
logical, in view of the peculiar fiduciary obligation imposed by
business custom upon the banker.
The agency once established, the vital question arises, Was the
agent paid? It is to this point that the dissenting opinion of
Collin, J., is directed. The bank was the holder's agent to receive
payment; in that capacity it could do no more. If A appoints as
his agent B's debtor, and B authorizes his debtor to pay A, which
authority is not carried out, it may safely be said, as a general
proposition, that A has not been paid. Negligence can not dis-
charge an instrument where presentment was made in reasonable
time, as was the case here; and the negligence in making pay-
ment, if none was made, consisted in the omission of a duty
owing to the maker. 6
But the negligence in the principal case was of such nature
as to work an estoppel. This must be taken as the holding of the
court on this point. Says Miller, J.: "By sending the note to
the Watkins bank . . . the plaintiffs . . . led the defendants
to suppose that their credit had been applied pro tanto to the
payment of the note, and lulled them into taking no further
measures either to pay the note or to draw upon the credit thus
appropriated." 7 If, in the supposititious case, supra, B's debtor,
A's agent, tells B that A will be paid, and the circumstance of
the parties is such that B can reasonably rely on his debtor's
word, and as a result of such reliance B suffers loss in having
the debt unpaid, will not A be estopped by the conduct of his
agent to claim from B ?8 Should it be contended that the bank
in making the representation was not acting within the agency
'conferred by the holder, the reply may be made that the bank
was the holder's agent to take payment and that extrinsic facts
surrounding the agency and giving the agent a power peculiar
to him are sufficient to base an estoppel in pais against his
principal."
The difficulty here is that the representation was a promise or,
at most, an assent. But if the reliance thereon was reasonable, it
surely should, under the circumstances, be equivalent to an act.
To hold that a depositor acts unreasonably in relying on the
'Sutherland v. First Nat. Bank, 31 Mich. 23o.
7 215 N. Y., at 81.
8 Griswold v. Haven, 25 N. Y. 595.
IN. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. v. Schuvler, 34 N. Y. 3o, 68, et seq.
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word of his banker, would strike a blow at the very foundation
of our commercial institutions. In fact, it may be suggested
here that no reliance was necessary, and that the assent accom-
plished.a novation. When the holder sent the note to the bank,
he surely assented to have the bank substituted as his debtor in
place of the maker; when the maker directed the bank to apply
his credit to the note, he surely offered a discharge pro tanto of
his claim against the bank in return for a promise by the bank to
pay to the holder and an assent by the holder to accept the sub-
stitution. Thus the assent of the bank consummated the transac-
tion; for the assent of the holder had already been given to
precisely such a transaction.
By considerations, perhaps, involving a parity of reasoning, the
court was induced to hold that the note was paid. Although not
essential to the decision of the case, the manner in which the hold-
ing was handed down, and the cogent reasoning and authorities
given in its support, will commend it as of binding force. The
conclusion is reached on the premise that the act of payment is
distinct from evidence of the act, and as long as the act occurred,
evidence of it is not important.
The difficulty suggested-i. e., the ascertainment of the fact-
is more apparent than real in the case at hand. If the maker had
handed money over the counter, and the bank had sent to the
holder a bad check, or had made no remittance, the note would
clearly have been paid as to the maker ;10o but if the maker had
passed a bad check over the counter and had been given a credit
memorandum, the note would not have been paid.1" That is, the
evidence of payment failing, the fact of payment would not
necessarily fail; and, on the other hand, the evidence of payment
established, the fact of payment is not necessarily established.
It is not to be supposed that the bank was to send to the holder
the identical money it obtained from the maker, and surely the
maker would never be required to do more than place in the
hands of the collecting agent sufficient funds to take up the
instrument. If the bank already has the sum or an equivalent
in its hands, would it not be unreasonable and legally unnecessary
to require a transfer and retransfer of the sum in order to con-
stitute payment? Lex neminem cogit ad vana seu inutilia. If the
"Morse on Banks and Banking, § 214.
"SSmith v. Miller, 6 Roberts. 157; Nat. Gold Bank v. McDonald, 51
Cal. 64.
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bank, "in fact, accepted an appropriation of the maker's credit
with it in payment of the note, that should constitute payment,"
and "the acceptance of the maker's verbal order to make the
application was an act fully as effective as, e. g., the marking of
the note paid."' 2
It is to be observed that there was in this case an acceptance
of the verbal order of the maker. Would the court, in the
absence of such order and acceptance, entertain the presumption
that the bank had performed its legal duty by paying the note?13
Several statements in the opinion would justify such conclusion.
But if, instead of appropriating the maker's credit to the pay-
ment of the note, the bank allows him to withdraw his entire
deposit, it is very questionable whether the note would be held
paid. In fact, sureties on the instrument would probably be dis-
charged, on the theory that the bank has prejudiced them by not
taking advantage of the opportunity to make the appropriation."4
It would, therefore, be more correct, in view of the facts of the
principal case, to say that on this point the Court held, that an
oral assent given by a bank, holding for collection the note of a
depositor, to the depositor's direction to pay it, is sufficient
evidence of payment.
A.M.
12215 N. Y., at 84, 85.
".tna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 82.
"Pitts v. Congdon, 2 N. Y. 352; Wright v. Austin, 56 Barb. I3; King
v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384, 39o, 393; Shutts v. Fingar, Ioo N. Y. 546;
Bank v. Smith, 66 N. Y. 272.
